Negotiation support systems (NSS)--computer assisted negotiations--provide decision support in problems involving multiple decision makers, thus extending decision support systems (DSS)--e.g., see Keen and Scott Morton ( 1978 1, Sprague and Carlson ( 1982 ) , Bonczek et a1 . ( 198 1 )--where the initial emphasis has been on single decision maker situations.
In general in NSS we are interested in multiplayer, multicriteria, ill-structured, dynamic problems. Shakun (1981a Shakun ( , 1981b Shakun ( , 1986 ) develops evolutionary systems design (ESD) as a methodology for problem definition and solution (design) in complex contexts involving multiplayer, multicriteria, ill-structured, dynamic problems.
In particular, in this paper ESD is used as a basis for MEDIATOR, a system designed to support negotiations in a setting which we now describe in overview form and develop in detail in the sections below. (Shakun 1985 (Shakun , 1986 .
In the basic scenario as described above, we think of the mediator as supporting the negotiations and in turn being supported by MEDIATOR, but not himself deciding on them. However, MEDIATOR should also be useful in compulsory arbitration where the mediator decides (chooses) the solution. In some contexts, the mediator can be a group leader, e.g., the president of a company, who finally makes a decision supported by MEDIATOR. In other contexts, MEDIATOR could support the players directly without the use of a human mediator. Here we work with the basic scenario as noted above.
Database-Centered DSS Design Overview
A number of DSS design strategies have been proposed, including those that start from the decision models used, from the user interfaces requires, or from a task analysis. In organizations where decisions are based on large amounts of existing data, it seems more natural to follow a database-centered approach. This method embeds the decision models and user interfaces of a DSS in an database management environment which provides them with data, stores their execution sequences, and retains (1981 ) , and others to cover not only the data management but also the model management and multiuser aspects of DSS.
In the negotiation support setting discussed in this paper, the database is also used as a communication center among the mediator and the players. Besides providing the initial data underlying the problem to be solved, the DBMS also manages the evolving group joint problem representations. Furthermore, it provides a large number of tools for generating this joint problem representation and protecting it against unauthorized or erroneous access.
Paper Outline
In the following sections, we develop this negotiation support system concept in detail. In section 2 we summarize the single decision maker case as background for the group negotiation problem discussed in section 3, based on (Shakun, 1985) . In section 4 we illustrate the use of MEDIATOR by an application to group car buying. The databasecentered system architecture for MEDIATOR is developed in section 5.
Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
THE CASE OF ONE DECISION MAKER
A DSS for MCDM involving one decision maker and applied to car buying is discussed in detail in Jacquet-Lagreze and Shakun (1984) .
Consider a set A of strategies (controls, inputs, decisions, choices, actions g(a)~Y,] is the corresponding set of a priori admissible inputs.
In addition to the admisible sets of cars, A, and goals, g(Ao) we have a preference structure defined on g(A,).
Here we assume a utility function u(y) which is nonlinear and additive:
With the UTA utility assessment procedure (Jacquet-Lagreze and Siskos , 1982) implemented in the microcomputer program, PREFCALC (Jacquet-Lagreze, 1985) , the marginal functions ui(yi) are taken as piecewise linear and nondecreasing or nonincreasing. Based on UTA, a disaggregation-aggregation learning process involving both wholistic and analytical judgments is implemented. Working with a small sample AICAo, a decision support system (Jacquet-Lagreze and Shakun, 1984) can aid a decision maker in defining his utility function (1). Applying the utility function to the set of cars A . results in a ranking of cars according to their numerical utilities. The car with the maximum utility is the buying decision. Figure 1 shows the criteria space. The technologically feasible set g(A) intersects the a priori goal target Yo to give the a priori admissible set g(Ao) = g(A)R yo) which typically in car buying has many points. In order to find a single point solution in criteria space, the intersection set g(Ao) must be reduced in size. This can be done either by contracting Yo or g(A).
Since for cars the latter set is fixed at a particular time, we contract Yo by using the user's utility function. By maximizing utility, the target Yo contracts to evolved goal target Y which has a single point intersection (solution) with g(Ao) at point B1 whose preimage in A . is the car buying decision (Ignore dotted curves, B2, BC, y2, and yC in figure 1 for the moment).
CROUP DECISION MAKING: NEGOTIATIONS
Assume each decision maker (player) in a group called coalition C has worked individually with the single-user DSS procedure outlined in section 2. If the same car does not have the highest utility for all players there is a conflict. Refering to Figure 1 , with two players (e.g. husband and wife), if B1 is player 1's output (highest utility) solution and B2 is player 2's, there is a conflict. Note geometrically that yC, the coalition (group) goal target --the intersection of the goal targets Y' and Y* for players 1 and 2, respectively, i.e. yC = y'f2y2 --has an empty intersection with g(~Co), the group admissible output set. In Figure 1 , for simplicity g(~Co) = Slg(Aj0) for players j = 1, 2 is simply shown as g(Ao).
If group goal target yC expands, e.g.
. by expansion through negotiations of goal targets Y and y2, there could be a solution at output point BC, the intersection between expanded yC and g(~Co).
It is clear from our discussion of Figure 1 that the search process for a solution involves contracting or expanding sets. By expansion (contraction) we mean that some new (old) points are added (dropped) to (from) a set; this expansion (contraction) does not preclude dropping (adding) some other points from (to) the set. Thus expansion/contraction involves a mapping from an original (current) set to a new set. For a group C, two sets are subject to expansion/contraction mapping.
They are: ( 1 ) g(~C) =g(~), the group technologically feasible output set or more precisely the admissible set g(~Co)=g(~)Q~Co where Y~~= Q Y~~, and (2) the group goal target yC = Q Y~.
In searching for a solution, i.e., searching for a single point intersection between g(~Co) and YC we note the following:
1. For the group goal target YC, higher utility aspirations (or goal demands) by players contract the target; lower utility aspirations (expressed in concession making) expand the target .
Goal target expansion/contraction involves negotiations.
2. For the group admissible technologically feasible set g(~Co), axioms can contract the feasible set and new technology can expand it. For example, with nondecreasing (or nonincreasing) marginal utility functions, the Pareto optimality axiom for utilities (Owen, 1982; Harsanyi, 1977; Luce and Raiffa, 1957) constrains (contracts) the feasible goal set to the upper right boundary in Figure 1 when searching for solutions. New technology cars on the market can expand the feasible set. In other words, feasible set contraction can employ solution concepts involving specification of axioms imposing agreedupon properties on the solution; expansion can involve withdrawal of of axioms previously specified or creation of new technological inputs.
The above search focusing on goal space is paralleled in car space and utility space because of the mapping from car space to goal space to utility space (via the marginal utility functions). Figure 2 shows utility space for two players corresponding to the goal space of Figure   FIGURE 2 Consider the group utility target = Q u~ where UJ is player j's utility target.
In arriving at a solution at point PC = (ul(BC), Figure 2 for the moment). The progress of negotiations, here concession-making in goal and utility spaces and corresponding concessions in car space can be shown by a DSS either graphically as in Figures 1 and 2 or as relational data in matrix form as in Table I .
TABLE I
In Table I , car Ẽ A ' , = RA~,, the group joint set of a priori admissible cars, is specified by name. The goals are: Y1 =C120 is the gasoline consumption, liters/lOOKm, at 120 Km/hr; y2= space is in square meters; y3=price is in French francs; y4=maximum speed is in kmlhr.
Utilities ul and u2 are the utilities of players 1 and 2, respectively.
For exchanging information, the DSS could display the larger set a&hj0 which includes cars a priori admissible to at least one player. In this case, a car inadmissible for player j would be listed as "inadmissible" in the utility column u but it conceivably could become admissible in j , the course of negotiations.
Thus, Table I If players change their marginal utility functions so that they approach one another, the feasible set in utility space approaches a positive-sloping 45' line whose highest utility point is the solution, PC* (Figure 2 ) thus achieving consensus. Of course, uC (initial) is readily adjusted to uC (adjusted) to give a single point intersection at PC*. In other words, in utility space, figure 2, there is a function F: In addition to exchanging information and negotiating to expand targets, players can consider the use of axioms to contract the feasible region, e.g., (1) to a single solution point in utility space--in Figure   2 , Nash axioms (Owen, 1982; Harsanyi, 1977; Luca and Raiffa, 1957 ) might
give solution point PC which is accomodated by the mapping: uC (initial) --6 (final), or ( 2 ) to a constrained set of points (e.g. the Pareto optimal set might. be (PI, PC, P21 in Figure 2 ). The latter could be followed by compromise (concessions) to select a single point from this
set, e.g. PC, or perhaps consensus leading to PC* might be realized. Table I1 shows the initial group mappings from control (car) to goal to utility spaces (ignore first and second evolved utilities for the moment). Suppose that player 2's initial individual problem representation had only three goal dimensions, say y,, y2, and y3, whereas player 1's had all four goals.
USING MEDIATOR: APPLICATION TO GROUP CAR BUYING DECISIONS
The common set of goal dimensions--the union--has all four goals with player 2 placing zero weight on y4. Note that in this example there is no conflict in group control and goal space, i.e., players have the same individual problem representation in these spaces. They only differ in their .
representations in group utility space as shown under ini tial utilities" in Table 11 .
A look at the initial individual marginal utility functions, Figure 3 , reveals the underlying preference conflict.
We consider several scenarios based on play by student/faculty players.
FIGURE 3
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Scenario 1
Players look at the initial utilities in Table I1 and perhaps, at the mediator's suggestion, at the utility functions in Figure 3 . From Table 11 , MEDIATOR displays the car rank orders and utilities shown in Opel, and player 2's his first choice, M230. The intersection of these two car targets is empty. Using Table 111 , if players continue to expand their individual car targets by stages until a nonempty intersection is achieved, then concession making will continue to the third stage with Opel as the intersection and compromise solution.
As another attempt at compromise, the mediator can ask MEDIATOR to compute the maxmin solution concept. First MEDIATOR normalizes each player's utilities between 0 (for his last car choice) and 1 (for his first car choice). Using Table 11 , for each car the normalized utility for each player and minimium utility comparing normalized utilities between players are computed and shown in Table IV .
TABLE IV
The car which maximizes the minimum utility giving a maximin utility of .77 is Opel which is the maxmin solution.
Thus both concession making following conditional car target expansion and the maxmin solution concept give Opel.
Scenario 2
After looking at the initial utilities in Table I1 and the marginal utility functions, Figure 3 , players decide to discuss their marginal utility functions and modify them to those shown in Figure 4 . This leads to an evolved group problem representation. Thus, in Table I1 has introduced a fifth goal dimension, y5, car nationality, to the group problem representation--imagine a column for goal y5 after goal y4 in Table I1 where German cars (Opel, Golf, M230, BMW) are assigned a nominal value of, say, 2 and all other cars a value of 1.
Using PREFCALC, player 2 modifies his marginal utility functions to those shown by the dotted lines in Figure 5 . He places a weight of .1 on car nationality, y5, and modifies the relative weights on the other criteria so that the sum of the weights equals 1. Note with PREFCALC1s utility normalization the criterion weight equals the marginal utility at the most preferred goal value considered. Player 1 places zero weight on car nationality, y5 so that his marginal utilities in Figure 5 are in effect the same as in Figure 4 .
FIGURE 5
The marginal utility functions in Figure 5 give overall utilities shown under "second evolved utilities" in represents a large utility drop for player 2 from his first choice. The mediator asks MEDIATOR to compute the maxmin solution. Using Table 11, for each car MEDIATOR computes the second evolved nomalized utility for each player and, comparing these, the minimim utility--see Table V . .44 (Table 11) if he were to consider M230 or Volvo, respectively.
Player 2 is convinced and accepts P505 as the solution.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE FOR MEDIATOR
In this section, we describe software requirements and a system architecture for MEDIATOR. Basically, MEDIATOR integrates a collection of software components used by the players and the human mediator through the use of a shared database. The need for analyzing such components in a DSS, in addition to the description of operational research models, arises from two sources. Any DSS must offer a user-friendly interface and efficient data access. Otherwise, it will not be used by computer-naive decision makers. More specifically, however, a multi-person DSS like MEDIATOR must also facilitate and structure the communication among the players and with the human mediator.
One approach to implementing such a communication facility is a (Huber, 1982) .
In contrast to these two methods, our approach is database-centered. The database-centered approach was introduced for single-user DSS by Donovan (1976) , and extended to hierarchically organized distributed DSS by Jarke (1981 Jarke ( , 1982 . This paper extends the approach further to Negotiation Support Systems. The rules of communication (also called communication protocols (Tanenbaum, 198 1 ) ) are implemented through granting different access rights to players and mediator. In the following subsections, we first motivate this approach by a requirements analysis, and then provide a more detailed technical description. As a running example, we shall use once more the two-player car buying application.
Systems Requirements for MEDIATOR
MEDIATOR is designed to provide user-friendly interfaces, efficient data and model access, and structured communication facilities to both the players and the mediator. Systems requirements for MEDIATOR can be grouped into two categories.
The first class of requirements is derived from the method itself.
Since negotiation is viewed as an evolutionary process of information exchange leading to consensus or compromise, the system has to provide efficient support for interactive use by decision makers and mediators with limited computer skills. Moreover, the system has to offer at least two kinds of representations for information display. A relational database system must support the matrix representation needed in the detailed display of criteria and utilities vs. alternatives (see Table   11 ). Additionally, the systems can present data graphically (e.g., piece-wise linear marginal utility functions, see Figure 3 ) . Jointly acceptable database. The method assumes that the players agree on a common underlying set of facts about the domain of decision.
The example of arms control negotiations shows that such an agreement may be very difficult to reach. The players may not even agree on a common scope of alternatives for a particular negotiation (e.g., strategic vs, Euro-strategic vs. space weapons). Moreover, disagreement on the underlying facts is almost certain. Therefore, MEDIATOR allows the players to agree that each will use their own data separately, i.e., an agreement exists that the players cannot agree on a common set of data. This version of the assumption may be the only way to get negotiations started if there is deep distrust among the players --witness again arms control negotiations. As an example, one player may compute a criterion 'lspacefl in square meters , whereas another one uses "space" or its synonym "roominessu but measures it in cubic feet. On the semantic side, both players could define "space" as the size of the inner sitting room; then, it would be desirable to merge the two criteria. Alternatively, one of the players may use "spaceu for the outer size of the car. This could lead to the apparent paradox that one player tries to minimize "spacew while the other is maximizing it. Clearly, it is appropriate here to rename and separate the criteria.
Each player defines preferences on criteria, e.g., a utility preference measure. However, preference measures used by players need not be the same.
As a consequence of these assumptions, MEDIATOR supports a two-phase negotiation process. In the first phase, called view integration, the human mediator is supported in achieving a joint problem representation in the three steps of: database selection, alternative definition, and criteria and preference definition. Upon successful completion of this phase, the second phase, called nxotiation, proceeds as described in sections 3 and 4.
Software Capabilities and Components
An architecture for the MEDIATOR DSS should offer some software capabilities to support the systems requirements described in section 5.1. We shall first review the major components of single-user DSS and then propose a specific architecture for MEDIATOR.
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Each player and the mediator employ a single-user personal DSS which has the traditional three components of model management, data management, and dialog management (Sprague and Carlson, 1982 ) . For MEDIATOR, this single-user DSS is a data-based version of PREFCALC (Jacquet-Lagreze, 1985) for the players and an enhanced version for the mediator.
The dialog manager is responsible for effective interaction between the DSS and its users, namely each player and the human mediator. It provides menu management, screen composition, and graphics as well as :.elational representation facilities .
The model manager consists of executable modules together with modelling language facilities and execution management. In particular, the negotiation models in the mediator DSS allow mappings of user changes (or adaptations) in all three spaces (control, goal, and utility space ) . Once this is accomplished, the joint problem representation is stored in the publicly accessible area of the common database. From then on, the "official" negotiation will only work with the joint representation. The players are free to continue using their local representation and other decision support tools for personal deliberations.
From a computer science point of view, MEDIATOR'S design poses the following research questions. How do we provide:
1. e f f i c i e n t database a c c e s s f o r each p l a y e r ?
d a t a b a s e and model base f a c i l i t i e s t o support t h e mediator?
3. communication between p l a y e r s and mediator? 4. u s e r i n t e r f a c e s f o r players/mediator?
The following two s u b s e c t i o n s a d d r e s s our s o l u t i o n s t o t h e s e problems, first f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l p l a y e r DSS, then f o r t h e mediator DSS
and its communication with t h e player DSS.
DSS o f t h e I n d i v j d u a l P l a y e r s
The DSS of t h e i n d i v i d u a l p l a y e r s are based on a stand-alone v e r s i o n of PREFCALC (Jacquet-Lagreze, 1985) . PREFCALC is a s i n g l e -u s e r
DSS implemented on a personal computer; its underlying a l g o r i t h m s have a l r e a d y been described i n S e c t i o n 2. The method assumes its i n p u t t o be s t o r e d i n a r e l a t i o n a l format where t h e r e c o r d s (rows o f t h e m a t r i x ) correspond t o a l t e r n a t i v e s and t h e columns t o criteria. The t a b l e e n t r i e s are c r i t e r i o n values.
I n earlier work ( J a r k e e t a l . , 1984; Jelassi, 1985 ; Jelassi e t a l . ,
1985), w e enhanced t h e system with u s e r -f r i e n d l y c a p a b i l i t i e s t o ( a ) a c c e s s e x t e r n a l mainframe d a t a b a s e s , ( b ) d e f i n e a l t e r n a t i v e s from s e t s , o f r e c o r d s r a t h e r than from s i n g l e r e c o r d s , and ( c ) use composite criteria computed from s t o r e d a t t r i b u t e s by user-defined o r s e l e c t e d f u n c t i o n s . The following d e s c r i p t i o n is based on ( J a r k e e t a l . , 1984).
Figure 8 shows how t h e PREFCALC i n p u t is generated from t h e d a t a b a s e . The method starts from a set of ALTERNATIVES, each c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a number of p r o p e r t i e s o r a t t r i b u t e s . For example, i n a car-buying example t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s are types o f cars and t h e b a s e r e l a t i o n would c o n t a i n r e l e v a n t a t t r i b u t e s such as "maximum speed", " f u e l consumption a t speed 120 km/hw, e t c . However, t h e s t o r e d r e l a t i o n may d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e type of c a r i n many more c l a s s e s t h a n needed f o r t h e d e c i s i o n . Thus, a d e c i s i o n a l t e r n a t i v e may correspond t o a set of s e v e r a l database records. 
Some ( b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a l l ) o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e d a t a b

Both t a s k s ( a l t e r n a t i v e and c r i t e r i a d e f i n i t i o n s ) are accomplished
by t h e afore-mentioned " g e n e r a l i z e d view processor" i n conjunction with a menu i n t e r f a c e g e n e r a t o r . The r e s u l t i n g u s e r view is c a l l e d t h e
DECISION MATRIX. I n o r d e r t o c r e a t e a d e c i s i o n m a t r i x , t h e u s e r h a s t o d e f i n e --through a sequence o f menus--how d e c i s i o n a l t e r n a t i v e s and d e c i s i o n c r i t e r i a are d e r i v e d from t h e underlying database.
A l t e r n a t i v e s are d e f i n e d i n two s t e p s . I n t h e d a t a stap;ing s t e p , t h e u s e r s e l e c t s a s u b s e t o r CATEGORY o f a l t e r n a t i v e s t o be considered.
For example, i n a c a r buying a p p l i c a t i o n , t h e u s e r may be i n t e r e s t e d only i n t r u c k s but n o t i n o t h e r t y p e s o f cars. Data s t a g i n g e x t r a c t s d a t a from one o r more mainframe d a t a b a s e s and c o n s t r u c t s from them a s i n g l e s e l e c t e d s u b r e l a t i o n ( t h e CATEGORY) on which a l l f u r t h e r processing w i l l be performed, u s i n g t h e microcomputer DSS d a t a b a s e .
Users may e i t h e r choose from a menu o f category names d e f i n e d i n t h e CATEGORY DEFINITIONS s e c t i o n o f t h e d a t a d i c t i o n a r y , o r d e f i n e t h e i r own category v i a a d i s t r i b u t e d d a t a b a s e query.
I n t h e grsgihg s t e p , t h e u s e r chooses a grouping o f d a t a b a s e r e c o r d s within t h e CURRENT CATEGORY r e l a t i o n such t h a t each group c o n s t i t u t e s a n ALTERNATIVE. Groups are d e f i n e d by common v a l u e s of c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t e s ( t h e ALT-NAME). For example, some p l a y e r may be interested in distinguishing cars only by their make and model, but not by details such as number of doors, engine power, etc.
Criteria are derived from attributes of the database records. In the simplest case, an attribute value can directly serve as a criterion value (e.g., maximum speed). Frequently, however, the criterion value may be a function of one or several attribute values. For example, a criterion "consumptionff may be defined as the average of the stored database values of fuel consumption in the city and on highways.
Moreover, whenever alternatives correspond to groups of records rather than to single records, criterion values must be based on aggregate functions over these records (e.g., average, minimum, maximum, forecast for next year). The data dictionary contains a library of such CRITERIA DEFINITIONS from which the user can choose the CURRENT CRITERIA, using a menu of CRIT-NAMES. (Of course, a more sophisticated user can also add functions to the library.)
Finally, the combination of alternative definitions (grouping) and criteria definitions (computations) allows the derivation of criterion values for alternatives (CRIT-VALUE) from the database. All of the above operations can be performed within an extended relational database framework discussed in detail in Jelassi 1985) . After the construction of the input matrix, the CATEGORY relation will be needed only if the multi-criteria decision method proposes the inclusion of a new criterion in order to resolve apparent inconsistencies in user preferences. Otherwise, the method proceeds to construct utility functions through aggregation and disaggregation of preferences, as described in Section 2 (see also Jacquet-Lagreze and Shakun ( 1984 ) ) .
DSS of the Mediator
In the previous subsection, it was demonstrated that a minor extension of the relational model of databases (Codd, 1970; Ullman, 1982 ) is sufficient to support the single-player data preparation process for the multiple criteria DSS, PREFCALC. In this subsection, this result will be extended. Relational operations, enhanced by redefinitions of terms, can also efficiently support the view integration phase of mediation. The discussion will follow the same
sequence (database selection, alternative definition, criteria and preference definition) as before. Subsequently, we review the mediation support tools used in the negotiation phase.
The first task in establishing a group joint problem representation is the choice of underlying databases upon which the definition and evaluation of alternatives can be based. In general, the mediator will have to start with the union of all such databases as far as they are A translation table must be used to permit a join among the different entity identifiers. This task may be complicated if no 1-to-1 mapping exists; in this case, the least common superset must be constructed to permit mappings. In most intraorganizational negotiations, however, the database selection step will be simple because players access the same organizational (mainframe) databases to begin with.
The database selection step establishes a logical view of the mainframe databases as a large "universal relation" (Ullman, 1982) .
From this, the group joint CATEGORY relation can be easily defined. As theory (see, e.g., (Ullman, 1982) ), can be exploited to simplify this naming problem. A database attribute is called functionally dependent on a set of other database attributes if for each combination of values of these attributes, the dependent attribute can assume at most one value, Obviously, each attribute is functionally dependent on itself.
Therefore, the first simplification is to unify the two occurences of ttMercedes" (provided both players mean the same thing --this, the mediator DSS can test by looking at the databases and groupings used by both players ) .
Assume that the database schema in the data dictionary also states that maximal speed is functionally dependent on make, model, and version; e . , for each version of a car, there is only one maximal speed. In this case, MEDIATOR can automatically simplify the group joint alternative grouping to make, model, and version. The simplified example alternative name then becomes just "Mercedes MlgO E". For the sake of player 1 , maximal speed will be retained as a criterion (but not as an alternative name) in the decision matrix.
If such automatic simplification proves insufficient, the human mediator will make other suggestions. One option was already mentioned:
reducing the set of alternatives by presenting only the intersectionfeasible ones. (In a many-player situation, the requirement of mutual feasibility can be relaxed to, e.g., "acceptable to at least 50%tt, Usually, one would expect that utility curves of players for the same criterion differ in weight and steepness but they will rarely cross (one monotonically increasing, the other one decreasing). If they do cross, this may mean severe value disagreements, or simply misunderstanding of terms.
Human mediator intervention to resolve such questions remains necessary even in the presence of an NSS. Looking at the function Therefore, the integration step will only be supported but not completely automated.
Once the alternatives and criteria have been integrated as far as appropriate, MEDIATOR constructs the group joint problem representation using the player's preference information.
As an example, consider the view integration process preceeding the negotiations described in section 4. In contrast to player 2 who wanted a city car, player 1 wants to use the ear mostly for business trips, He is therefore initially interested in highway consumption, high speed, a limited price, and much space. His database has more detailed information on consumption at various speeds but is otherwise identical to that of player 2. In the first step of view integration, both players agree to use the intersection of the two sets of acceptable cars, ruling out sports versions which were not acceptable to player 2.
Both players name one of their criteria "consumptionw but a review of the criteria definitions by MEDIATOR reveals that one means the DIN consumption, the other one the highway consumption. Since both measures are highly correlated, and player 1's business trips will account for most of the kilometers anyway, the players agree in the criteria integration phase to work on the basis of highway consumption, and to call this criterion C120. The criterion, space, has identical definitions in both decision matrices and will simply be merged. Based on this information, both players reconsider their utility evaluations and come up with the initial group joint problem representation shown in shown the impossibility to do this automatically; however, practical ways around this problem have also been devised (Furtado and Casanova, 1985) . However, these methods are very difficult to implement. Moreover, it is not clear from an application standpoint whether this solution is even desirable --consider, e.g., a second channel of communication among the players which might result in considerable confusion unless a common language is enforced.
The remaining MEDIATOR tools support the human mediator in the actual negotiation phase as described in Section 3. The implementation of the comprehensive example presented in section 4 is based on the group joint problem representation as just developed. Here, we just summarize the major software tools grouped by the problem space in which they apply. We do not consider behavioral tools such as Delphi, NGT, etc.; for an overview, see (Bui and Jarke, 1984) , (DeSanctis and Callupe , 1984) , or (Huber , 1984) .
MEDIATOR allows the human mediator to perform what-if analyses of possible suggestions he might make. Before, e.g., suggesting that players should lower their utility threshold, the mediator must make certain that this will generate additional alternatives for discussion.
Otherwise, the players will feel that they made a concession for nothing and the climate of the negotiation may deteriorate.
In the contra space, the relational query language offers the option of including or excluding sets of alternatives from consideration abilities. An underlying assumption made in this context is that players are actually interested in a fast decision while preserving their interest --an assumption that is usually justified in intraoriganizational negotiations but may not hold in other cases.
In summary, the tools described here are mostly database and display tools, related to the algorithms presented in Section 3. Other mathematical or behavioral tools may also be needed but their discussion would go beyond the scope of this paper; see (Shakun, 1985) 
